Politics: duty, religion, and/or the masses?

A minister friend of mine was asked about the recent US election and the disappointment voiced by those who put their faith in their version of a god and saw their candidate lose. He was asked how people in this situation should react. It got me thinking about the political process and the philosophical implications behind it.

The two predominant philosophies are either a) do what is best for the most (Bentham, Mill) or b) do what is best for duty to the most (Hegel, Kant). Very similar and the subtle differences is where the argument begins. Neither assumes any religiosity but I will attempt to interject that position as well (to satisfy the above).

In the first case, the argument is that politics should reflect what is the best for the most people possible. Some would argue that this is a derivation of Socialism, and without minutiae it is. But this in no way suggests that the result of an election represent this in any way. Popular vote does not equal beneficial for the most. What would would be a person elected who has the primary task of determining what the largest group needs and then providing it. In no way does this reflect the idea that the will of the people does the most good.

What is lost here is the subtle implications of what "beneficial to most" really means. In Nazi Germany it meant what benefitted the Aryan people the most. Under the Holy Roman Empire, Catholics (the minority) were those who benefited the most. Both cases the true meaning of "most" is lost. In this case is where religion intercedes and determines not only who the "most" is, but how they would best be benefited. In short, it is a facade concealing a dictatorship.

The second case seems the most obvious, until one argues what a duty is. Kant wrote his magnum opus on just that question, as did Kant. And yet to this day the argument of what is "duty" is still unanswered. To use the Holy Roman Empire example, the duty of a person was to attend mass, tithe, and follow the edicts of the Church. This duty was one proscribed by "god". But while the Empire was in command of vast areas, those who were Catholic were in the actual minority. What then of the veracity of duty?

To borrow from Rorty's public/private language construct, if a group of serial killers and a group of suicidal people were to form their own country, then the duty would be clearly defined as the killers would kill those who wished to die. Of course this is a ludicrous example, but it does serve to illustrate the ambiguity of the concept of "duty".

How then to resolve? If one discounts duty as being illogical and best for all as impossible, then the only solution is to follow Nietzsche's solution to eternal recurrence: to do whatever one wishes that is outside what is expected. To be who one wishes to be without law or deference to others. It is the base concept behind his Zarathustra.

The argument goes that religion and duty only serve to shackle a person and since one is bound to live the same life for eternity, in order to not be a slave, one must cast the shackles off at every opportunity. Proto-anarchy. It is not pure anarchy, which is completely lawless. One still follows the laws that are beneficial to oneself, ones that would benefit all lifetimes for eternity. In this regard one incurs Existential angst, but the benefit outweighs the cost.

A Slave Unto Oneself

As long as the mind is enslaved, the body can never be free. Psychological freedom, a firm sense of self-esteem, is the most powerful weapon against the long night of physical slavery. MARTIN LUTHER KING, speech, Aug. 16, 1967 

The enslaving of the mind is akin to physical slavery and in fact, is a necessary step to enslave one. A body, a physicality, can not function outside the control of the mind. Hegel has argued that  if a man be a slave, then it is done through his own free will, and not that of the enslaver.

There are many forms of slavery, some literal and many less so. Are there any cases of slavery where one is not responsible for being the slave? Where one is enslaved entirely against one's will? Is Hegel wrong?

First off I need to address the question of non-possession, a principle of satyagraha. Basically it is the belief that one does not possess anything nor is possessed by anything. It is a circular argument much in the same way as arguing whether a person with a starving family who steals food to feed them is doing the moral/immoral thing. I will address non-possession in a future post. So I shall set it aside for now.

To narrow the scope of my argument, I will focus something Victor Hugo wrote in Les Miserables. Hugo claimed that slavery only applies to women and it is the case of prostitution.

There are obvious cases of women who choose to be prostitutes, and by extension adult film actresses. These women are not slaves as the are maintaining their commitment to their own absolute freedom. They choose to sell their bodies for sexual gratification in exchange for money or other arrangement. They are not slaves, but utilizing their free will.

Next are those that come to the profession through drugs/necessity. Both of these cases involve the women surrendering themselves to slavery with their full acknowledgment. They choose to take the drugs and lie that it is the addiction that makes them do so. Addiction is merely a state of being where one surrenders one's freedom to the affect of a drug. Combined with prostitution and it becomes a sort of double-slavery. Or they mount their bills to the point where all they see is the "quick money" of being a prostitute. They lie to themselves and say that they will only do it to pay off whatever they have to and then stop. If they were truly able to do that, they would not be slaves. But how few actually accomplish that?

Lastly are those that are stolen in the night and forced to become prostitutes through intimidation, violence, and addiction. In this last case is there an argument against them being slaves of their own will? For one to be abducted, one has to allow it to happen. A person who ultimately desires to maintain their absolute freedom would never allow oneself to be taken. All that follows the abduction are means to maintain control over one's desire for freedom. But it is the one who allows one's freedom to be usurped. Death, to paraphrase Hegel, is the ultimate expression of absolute freedom.

So aside from actively choosing prostitution, all other examples lead to slavery through one's own free choice. One surrenders their commitment to absolute freedom, exercises free will and  becomes a slave by choice.

Debugging morality v. ethics

It is, indeed, a fact that, in the midst of society and sociability every evil inclination has to place itself under such great restraint, don so many masks, lay itself so often on the procrustean bed of virtue, that one could well speak of a martyrdom of the evil man. In solitude all this falls away. He who is evil is at his most evil in solitude: which is where he is at his best - and thus to the eye of him who sees everywhere only a spectacle also at his most beautiful.


from Nietzsche's Daybreak, s. 499, R.J. Hollingdale transl

All morality finds it basis in religion. It is religious "don't or do dos". The Bible has a codified list of things people should not do. Laws have been enacted based upon them. Many of those laws fall under what is known as the "Puritan Laws", but the majority are not.



And this is where ethics becomes distinctively separate. Sartre always argued that is there was no god, man would create himself. Man would judge each action. The existential movement echoes this belief. Religion removed from actions.

To get more into the minutea, morality has the rule of not killing. It is an amoral act. Punishable. All countries have laws that deal with this. Some execute people who violate this law. Some versions of religious texts allow for retribution.

Hegel argued against retribution. He found it to be something that no society should uphold, that taking the life of another was a violation of that person's rights. Ethics.

Here's how it is different from morality: In religion a person is told what they are allowed and not allowed to do. They are given the moral laws of their faith, complete with punishments. In ethics a person must judge for themselves if their action violates the actions of others while satisfying the actions of themselves.

"Now, being God might very well mean to know everything. But you must understand that even for God the knowing don't come easy. So when a question come up that stumped his big ol' God-brain, he set about finding an answer. And that's where we come in. He invented morality and planted it in our breasts. And only through our actions could he ever hope to learn about that particular thing. (84)"

The Sound of Building Coffins, Louis Maistros, New Milford,CT: 2009 The Toby Press LLC

While it seems fundamentally the same as a moral situation, an ethical one is not. The difference resides in the person. A moral person knows that killing is wrong and should not be done. An ethical person reasons whether killing another would deny that person rights and whether those violated rights were less important than them being killed. And an ethical person is not bound by the rights of the person. Nietzsche would argue that one who considered the rights of others was just a sheep. If a person deemed another should be killed, then that person should follow through on it.

Religion does not influence morality, it is the basis for it. Religion creates laws, laws that are shaped by its belief system. Morality does not stand up to the harsh light of ethical review.

Nowism

A key component to religion is personal survival after bodily death; that our "soul goes somewhere". One could view religion as a risk/reward situation, in which, the risks of living a "good" life, avoiding the temptations of "badness", are rewarded with an eternal afterlife. The pious gain an eternity of goodness, and the evil an eternity of suffering in the common view. The neutral? Hard to say. As morality can be attributed, at least in part, to religious principles, what would be the point of being moral, of being good, if there was no afterlife? Is it even plausible to consider that religion could survive the extinction of an afterlife, that once we die, we die for all time?

With the prevalence of religions ascribing a continuation of life beyond the grave, one could assume that no religion could "survive" without allowing for a continuance of life. The very concept of an afterlife plays upon the apparent human vanity of needing to believe that something lies beyond our comprehension, beyond simple mortality. It is akin to gamblers spending their money on the "sure thing", hoping that eventually it will pay off.

It seems impossible that a religion could be viable if it did not offer something for its worshippers that did not entail supernaturality. The struggle would be to convince people that while this is the only life that they will ever know, that once their mortal life is over, nothing comes after. As such this religion must find a compelling argument that it is in this existence that a person can find a kind of salvation that has meaning. And this is where the religion without an afterlife must find a way to counter the warning of Shelley's Ozymandias.

This religion, call it Nowism, must be founded on the belief that it is in this mortal life a person must strive to become the purity of its god. Since there is no afterlife to segregate the pious from the non, reward and suffering must manifest itself in the now, and be a direct reflection of the individual. If a person lives his/her life poorly, evilly, then the person will find naught but evil returning and plaguing his/herself.

Nowism has many examples as tools to convince people of its possibility. One could argue that the vanity, the covetness, of people have brought great suffering to the world. Global warming, wars, genocide, and crime in general, are indicators of evil wrought by one's own hands. Nin attributes it to maleness and passivity of women. It is not the role of god to end these violations, but squarely in the hands of the followers. If they were to examine their lives, as Socrates urged, they would know that they have not lived in piety, but in irreverence, and as such, the forces of the universe have repaid them with the penalties of their actions.

Instead of offering salvation at some later time, Nowism could offer salvation every day with every action. At the same time it would offer damnation at every action as well. Nowism would border closely to the Sartreian maxim of man, in the absence of god, creating himself. But man creating himself would not be to establish morality from situation to situation, but through reflection of end results. If killing a bad person would save a community from evil, then is it the moral thing to do? Hegel has made the point that the punishment of the criminal must not be determined as though he were a "harmful animal" that must be made harmless.

Since that is so, punishment is regarded as containing the criminal's right and hence by being punished he is honoured as a rational being. He does not receive this due of honour unless the concept and measure of his punishment are derived from his own act. Still less does he receive it if he is treated either as a harmful animal who has to be made harmless, or with a view to deterring and reforming him. (Philosophy of Right, §100).

It puts the emphasis for actions squarely in the hands of the individual.

And an interesting possibility for Nowism is that a god of some sort would not be necessary. In this regard it would more closely approximate the Eastern religions which weigh a person's life by their actions. What would be missing from Nowism though would be reincarnation. It would be an escape from Nietzsche's Eternal Recurrence. A person would have but one shot at living a pious life, to generate as much good as possible. Since humanity seems to need something beyond the grave, Nowism could emphasize the reward of eternal recognition, much the way that Gandhi is venerated. There is no proof that Gandhi lives in some supernatural world, but memory of his actions and of him are quite alive still.

As interesting as Nowism would be, it would most likely fall by the wayside, would lose out to the religions that offer something more beyond this life. Nowism would face an uphill battle to win converts from the self-obsessed, from those that an afterlife must exist for. It is because of this that a religion without an afterlife is not viable. It offers mankind nothing more than is available now. And yet, Nowism appears to be a more plausible answer to the question of life.

A bit of Hegel regarding will

Removing one's will from the body is not relinquishing one's will, one's self. Only death could accomplish that. Allowing another to possess oneself, in the apparent absence of the will is just an act of the will, but not a true possession, nor is it coercion. The will is not something that can be arbitrarily turned off and on, as it is an universal. Only through the rejection of life, accepting death, does the will cease to be our own will. Existence is not to be confused with Dasein, and I think this may be the crux of the problem.