In the 50s Alan Turing in Computing Machinery and Intelligence proposed what is known as the Turing Test, which measures whether a machine is truly intelligent. Basically a human asks questions of A and B and has to determine which one is a machine and which one is a human. No machine has successfully beaten the test.
Until IBM's Watson went on Jeopardy!.
Sure the voice could use some tweaks, but the Turing Test is purely a text-based test. That test Watson would win every single time.
Why is this significant? Because now we can no longer dance around the subject of when does a machine become a living thing. No more weird "qualia" talk. No more "does a soul exist?" Simply put, at what point of advancement do we consider machines to be living beings?
Yes, humans built and programmed Watson. While Watson obviously has the equivalent IQ of 150+ Watson is dependent upon humans. Watson is not alive. Not yet at least.
How do we define "living being?" Is it different from a virus? Before answering consider that viruses are capable of reproduction, have intelligence (whether measurable or not), have adaptive abilities and evolutionary processes, and quite possibly socialization.
Watson, in the correct environment could reproduce. Watson is capable of adapting. And possibly of evolution and socialization.
Is language a criterion? How do we then define language? Bees communicate but in no manner we truly understand. Watson communicates not only in English (and understands inferential references which are the most difficult to understand) but with various Machine languages.
Watson's one major limitation is its reliance on electricity. And that is the last defining line between non-living and living: self-sufficiency. Once Watson, or some other machine, is capable of self-sufficiency then machines will be Machines - an entirely new species.
Showing posts with label theory of mind. Show all posts
Showing posts with label theory of mind. Show all posts
22 February 2011
18 July 2009
Brain-state and causality
Let's start with a quote by Donald Davidson:
The notion of supervenience, as I have used it, is best thought of as a relation between a predicate and a set of predicates in a language: a predicate p is supervenient on a set of predicates S if for every pair of objects such that p is true of one and not of the other there is a predicate of S that is true of one and not of the other (Davidson, 1985, p. 242).
Previous theories had argued that claims concerning the identity of particular mental and physical events depended upon the discovery of lawlike relations between mental and physical properties. These theories thus held that empirical evidence supporting such laws was required for particular identity claims. According to Anomalous Monism, however, it is precisely because there can be no such strict laws that causally interacting mental events must be identical to some physical event. The token-identity thesis thus requires no empirical evidence and depends on there being no lawlike relations. It in effect justifies the token-identity of mental and physical events through arguing for the impossibility of type-identities between mental and physical properties or kinds (Davidson 1970, 209, 212-13; see Johnston 1985).
To draw his ideas out further, x=y IFF z (z causes x and implies y or z causes y and implies x) and z (x causes z and implies y or y causes z and implies x).
An explanation of an agent's action can be considered adequate only if it shows the action in question to be reasonable against the background of an agent's beliefs and desires. This latter
condition together with the truth condition, which states that the propositional attitudes a rationalization attributes to an agent must be true, form the necessary conditions for the justification model of explanation.
Davidson considers the above conditions necessary but not sufficient. The deficiency of the justification model is explained by drawing attention to the distinction between having a
reason for an action and having the reason why one performs an action. For a reason to be the reason why one performs an action the reason must cause the action.
For example, one has a reason to turn on the television, say, to watch one's favorite TV show. But this need not be the reason why one turns on the television. This is because the above reason did not cause one to turn on the television.
As Davidson puts it:
[S]omething essential has certainly been left out, for a person can have a reason for an action, and perform the action, and yet this reason not be the reason why he did it.
The reason for one to turn on the television could simply be because one is lonely and desires company. Thus, one reason (namely, to keep one company) was the cause of the action while the other reason (namely, to watch one's favorite show) wasn't.
Davidson continues:
Of course, we can include this idea too in justification; but then the notion of justification becomes as dark as the notion of reason until we can account for the force of that "because."
The mere possibility that a person acted on the basis of one reason rather than another presents an insurmountable obstacle. The anti-causalist has no way of accounting for the force of the "because" in the rationalization.
The only solution, according to Davidson, is to view the efficacious reasons (the ones that account for the correct rationalization) as causes of action. This leaves us, according to Davidson, with only one alternative to justificationalism, namely, the view that reason explanation is a species of causal explanation.
According to Anomalous Monism, however, it is precisely because there can be no such strict laws that causally interacting mental events must be identical to some physical event.
X=X but is not dependent on brain-state.
The notion of supervenience, as I have used it, is best thought of as a relation between a predicate and a set of predicates in a language: a predicate p is supervenient on a set of predicates S if for every pair of objects such that p is true of one and not of the other there is a predicate of S that is true of one and not of the other (Davidson, 1985, p. 242).
Previous theories had argued that claims concerning the identity of particular mental and physical events depended upon the discovery of lawlike relations between mental and physical properties. These theories thus held that empirical evidence supporting such laws was required for particular identity claims. According to Anomalous Monism, however, it is precisely because there can be no such strict laws that causally interacting mental events must be identical to some physical event. The token-identity thesis thus requires no empirical evidence and depends on there being no lawlike relations. It in effect justifies the token-identity of mental and physical events through arguing for the impossibility of type-identities between mental and physical properties or kinds (Davidson 1970, 209, 212-13; see Johnston 1985).
To draw his ideas out further, x=y IFF z (z causes x and implies y or z causes y and implies x) and z (x causes z and implies y or y causes z and implies x).
An explanation of an agent's action can be considered adequate only if it shows the action in question to be reasonable against the background of an agent's beliefs and desires. This latter
condition together with the truth condition, which states that the propositional attitudes a rationalization attributes to an agent must be true, form the necessary conditions for the justification model of explanation.
Davidson considers the above conditions necessary but not sufficient. The deficiency of the justification model is explained by drawing attention to the distinction between having a
reason for an action and having the reason why one performs an action. For a reason to be the reason why one performs an action the reason must cause the action.
For example, one has a reason to turn on the television, say, to watch one's favorite TV show. But this need not be the reason why one turns on the television. This is because the above reason did not cause one to turn on the television.
As Davidson puts it:
[S]omething essential has certainly been left out, for a person can have a reason for an action, and perform the action, and yet this reason not be the reason why he did it.
The reason for one to turn on the television could simply be because one is lonely and desires company. Thus, one reason (namely, to keep one company) was the cause of the action while the other reason (namely, to watch one's favorite show) wasn't.
Davidson continues:
Of course, we can include this idea too in justification; but then the notion of justification becomes as dark as the notion of reason until we can account for the force of that "because."
The mere possibility that a person acted on the basis of one reason rather than another presents an insurmountable obstacle. The anti-causalist has no way of accounting for the force of the "because" in the rationalization.
The only solution, according to Davidson, is to view the efficacious reasons (the ones that account for the correct rationalization) as causes of action. This leaves us, according to Davidson, with only one alternative to justificationalism, namely, the view that reason explanation is a species of causal explanation.
According to Anomalous Monism, however, it is precisely because there can be no such strict laws that causally interacting mental events must be identical to some physical event.
X=X but is not dependent on brain-state.
11 July 2009
Kant and Love
Kant put forth an idea that love is nothing more than the legal co-ownership of physical parts. Many philosophers have bemoaned this idea, notably Horkheimer, as though love is an actual obtainable ideal. I put forth that love is nothing more than acquiring goods in return for services, a form of capitalism, if you will.
Zeus would impregnate females on whim. De Sade used love for the purpose of exploring sexual taboos. English Parliament sought to marry its "virgin queen" to secure power over the French.
Throughout history love has been nothing more than utilitarian, except in the prose of the poets.
I state that love does not exist, but is simply a tool to achieve "something": power, riches, social standing, sexual fulfillment, and/or lust. I should have better defined "love". Love in the romantic sense can be best defined as a complex neurochemical response, one that can be mimicked by chocolate. The endorphins create a "pleasant" feeling, and one could argue, an addiction. This would explain the "heart break" phenomena.
My post is a bit of a Catch-22, on rethink. Stating that love is an acquisition of goods is almost equating it to the classic psychological question of "if you give a beggar money, do you do it for the beggar or yourself?" I suppose it opens love up to the Ontological question.
But, based on our knowledge of neurotransmitters, the endorphins and such, it does seem plausible that Kant was truly on to something more universal than the arranged marriages of his time.
I also agree that familial love is a bit different, but that too could be a form of endorphin addiction, though I would suspect that a different sort of neurotransmitter is involved. But, if familial love was without boundaries, without a give and take of wants, there would not be estranged families.
In all, love seems to be a complex weave of neuron firings, social more' fulfillment, and desired resolution of a want.
Zeus would impregnate females on whim. De Sade used love for the purpose of exploring sexual taboos. English Parliament sought to marry its "virgin queen" to secure power over the French.
Throughout history love has been nothing more than utilitarian, except in the prose of the poets.
I state that love does not exist, but is simply a tool to achieve "something": power, riches, social standing, sexual fulfillment, and/or lust. I should have better defined "love". Love in the romantic sense can be best defined as a complex neurochemical response, one that can be mimicked by chocolate. The endorphins create a "pleasant" feeling, and one could argue, an addiction. This would explain the "heart break" phenomena.
My post is a bit of a Catch-22, on rethink. Stating that love is an acquisition of goods is almost equating it to the classic psychological question of "if you give a beggar money, do you do it for the beggar or yourself?" I suppose it opens love up to the Ontological question.
But, based on our knowledge of neurotransmitters, the endorphins and such, it does seem plausible that Kant was truly on to something more universal than the arranged marriages of his time.
I also agree that familial love is a bit different, but that too could be a form of endorphin addiction, though I would suspect that a different sort of neurotransmitter is involved. But, if familial love was without boundaries, without a give and take of wants, there would not be estranged families.
In all, love seems to be a complex weave of neuron firings, social more' fulfillment, and desired resolution of a want.
08 July 2009
Is theory of mind true science?
Using Searle's Chinese Room as a basis, when it was first proposed, it was believed to be untestable because of the limitations of computer technology. Even so, to test it would have required the inclusion of computer science and mathematics. Theory of mind at that point was just philosophy and thus pseudo science (Popper, Kuhn).
But, along came several brilliant philosophers (Mooney comes to mind) who thoroughly destroyed that test and showed that a computer could beat the room.
Now, because theory of mind was able to solve the puzzle of the room without incorporating help from what is considered true sciences, it was able to satisfy Popper's falsifiability, pass Kuhn's test, refute Holism, and complete a Bayesian equation. As such, theory of mind transitioned from pseudo science to true science.
Additional evidence is Dennett being moved from the philosophy department to the cognitive science department, and UGA building an AI program that depends on theory of mind.
But, along came several brilliant philosophers (Mooney comes to mind) who thoroughly destroyed that test and showed that a computer could beat the room.
Now, because theory of mind was able to solve the puzzle of the room without incorporating help from what is considered true sciences, it was able to satisfy Popper's falsifiability, pass Kuhn's test, refute Holism, and complete a Bayesian equation. As such, theory of mind transitioned from pseudo science to true science.
Additional evidence is Dennett being moved from the philosophy department to the cognitive science department, and UGA building an AI program that depends on theory of mind.
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