Without a doubt, sex is a physical act, one acted upon every second of each day by a myriad of creatures. Being human, we feel this "necessity" to pare it down to some sort of Davidsonian act, an act that needs the subconscious motivations explained. But do we?
In its simplest form, two (or more) beings engage in coitus. The base desire is procreation. It is something that is encoded in all known dna from elephants to amoebas. We couple with another, and not necessarily with a differing sex, because our genetics tell us we need to do so. Even Spock had to (Star Trek bonus points).
Being advanced creatures with few peers, or so we think, should we be above base instincts? Should we deny the animal within? And if we do not, why do we not?
Kant had the idea that sex was a degradation of human nature, a "necessary evil" almost. We participated because it was our nature to do so. To follow that line, one that could avoid having sex would be a more enlightened being. Hence chastity amongst religious sectors. In a nutshell, we have sex because we can't avoid it.
Davidson would argue (and Haack as well) that our need for sexual coupling may have nothing to do at all with fulfilling sexual need, but emotional ones or even naricissistic ones. We have sex because it appeases something other than a base instinct, from boredom to dominance of another.
Person 'A' finds person 'B' attractive. A's hormones begin to work against him/her and compel one to approach B for the sole intent of coupling. B accepts because of the same hormone reaction. What follows afterwards is not part of the sexual experience. It is the act itself that matters, the one that is in question.
In its simplest form, sexual congress is the conjoining of at least 2 individuals/creatures for the sole purpose of attempting to procreate. Whether that happens or not is moot. It is the act itself that matters. And it is in that act that Davidsonian/Pessimistic arguments fall to the wayside. Procreation overrules all other base desires.
As example, one finds another attractive. A to B. A has a subconscious reaction that causes A to desire to procreate, subconscious or not. What follows has nothing to do with the act itself. A may rape B or go home an masturbate or even have sex with C while thinking of B. In the end, the desire to attempt to procreate is satisfied.
In the end, as long as the desire to procreate is satisfied objectification of others and such is an extension of that desire and one that can be parsed from it. It is a perversion or sexual diet that while dependent upon procreation, uses it only as its initial source motivation. We have initially have sex because we want to create children. What follows once the clothes are removed can be entirely different.
Showing posts with label kant. Show all posts
Showing posts with label kant. Show all posts
02 December 2012
18 November 2012
Politics: duty, religion, and/or the masses?
A minister friend of mine was asked about the recent US election and the disappointment voiced by those who put their faith in their version of a god and saw their candidate lose. He was asked how people in this situation should react. It got me thinking about the political process and the philosophical implications behind it.
The two predominant philosophies are either a) do what is best for the most (Bentham, Mill) or b) do what is best for duty to the most (Hegel, Kant). Very similar and the subtle differences is where the argument begins. Neither assumes any religiosity but I will attempt to interject that position as well (to satisfy the above).
In the first case, the argument is that politics should reflect what is the best for the most people possible. Some would argue that this is a derivation of Socialism, and without minutiae it is. But this in no way suggests that the result of an election represent this in any way. Popular vote does not equal beneficial for the most. What would would be a person elected who has the primary task of determining what the largest group needs and then providing it. In no way does this reflect the idea that the will of the people does the most good.
What is lost here is the subtle implications of what "beneficial to most" really means. In Nazi Germany it meant what benefitted the Aryan people the most. Under the Holy Roman Empire, Catholics (the minority) were those who benefited the most. Both cases the true meaning of "most" is lost. In this case is where religion intercedes and determines not only who the "most" is, but how they would best be benefited. In short, it is a facade concealing a dictatorship.
The second case seems the most obvious, until one argues what a duty is. Kant wrote his magnum opus on just that question, as did Kant. And yet to this day the argument of what is "duty" is still unanswered. To use the Holy Roman Empire example, the duty of a person was to attend mass, tithe, and follow the edicts of the Church. This duty was one proscribed by "god". But while the Empire was in command of vast areas, those who were Catholic were in the actual minority. What then of the veracity of duty?
To borrow from Rorty's public/private language construct, if a group of serial killers and a group of suicidal people were to form their own country, then the duty would be clearly defined as the killers would kill those who wished to die. Of course this is a ludicrous example, but it does serve to illustrate the ambiguity of the concept of "duty".
How then to resolve? If one discounts duty as being illogical and best for all as impossible, then the only solution is to follow Nietzsche's solution to eternal recurrence: to do whatever one wishes that is outside what is expected. To be who one wishes to be without law or deference to others. It is the base concept behind his Zarathustra.
The argument goes that religion and duty only serve to shackle a person and since one is bound to live the same life for eternity, in order to not be a slave, one must cast the shackles off at every opportunity. Proto-anarchy. It is not pure anarchy, which is completely lawless. One still follows the laws that are beneficial to oneself, ones that would benefit all lifetimes for eternity. In this regard one incurs Existential angst, but the benefit outweighs the cost.
The two predominant philosophies are either a) do what is best for the most (Bentham, Mill) or b) do what is best for duty to the most (Hegel, Kant). Very similar and the subtle differences is where the argument begins. Neither assumes any religiosity but I will attempt to interject that position as well (to satisfy the above).
In the first case, the argument is that politics should reflect what is the best for the most people possible. Some would argue that this is a derivation of Socialism, and without minutiae it is. But this in no way suggests that the result of an election represent this in any way. Popular vote does not equal beneficial for the most. What would would be a person elected who has the primary task of determining what the largest group needs and then providing it. In no way does this reflect the idea that the will of the people does the most good.
What is lost here is the subtle implications of what "beneficial to most" really means. In Nazi Germany it meant what benefitted the Aryan people the most. Under the Holy Roman Empire, Catholics (the minority) were those who benefited the most. Both cases the true meaning of "most" is lost. In this case is where religion intercedes and determines not only who the "most" is, but how they would best be benefited. In short, it is a facade concealing a dictatorship.
The second case seems the most obvious, until one argues what a duty is. Kant wrote his magnum opus on just that question, as did Kant. And yet to this day the argument of what is "duty" is still unanswered. To use the Holy Roman Empire example, the duty of a person was to attend mass, tithe, and follow the edicts of the Church. This duty was one proscribed by "god". But while the Empire was in command of vast areas, those who were Catholic were in the actual minority. What then of the veracity of duty?
To borrow from Rorty's public/private language construct, if a group of serial killers and a group of suicidal people were to form their own country, then the duty would be clearly defined as the killers would kill those who wished to die. Of course this is a ludicrous example, but it does serve to illustrate the ambiguity of the concept of "duty".
How then to resolve? If one discounts duty as being illogical and best for all as impossible, then the only solution is to follow Nietzsche's solution to eternal recurrence: to do whatever one wishes that is outside what is expected. To be who one wishes to be without law or deference to others. It is the base concept behind his Zarathustra.
The argument goes that religion and duty only serve to shackle a person and since one is bound to live the same life for eternity, in order to not be a slave, one must cast the shackles off at every opportunity. Proto-anarchy. It is not pure anarchy, which is completely lawless. One still follows the laws that are beneficial to oneself, ones that would benefit all lifetimes for eternity. In this regard one incurs Existential angst, but the benefit outweighs the cost.
27 September 2012
Davidsonian Primary Reason vs Kant's Moralism as applied to love
Donald Davidson's idea of a Primary Reason can be summed as a reason causes an action. The prototypical example is you want light so you turn a light on. And sure it can be pared down to multiple reasons, such as being afraid of the dark or staying in a place that you can't navigate in the dark. But even then, Occam-wise you turn the light on because you want light.
Kant believed that for a thing to be moral (action), one must not benefit from it because that destroys its value. Giving a beggar money then is not moral because one could benefit from it because one feels better about one's own condition. Basically altruism does not exist, as argued earlier (http://thewhyquestion.blogspot.com/2011/03/altruism-aka-lie-we-tell-ourselves.html).
Love is defined as having affection and personal attachment for something. We can love bacon (reason) so we cook and eat it as often as possible (action). But we benefit from it because it fulfills our need to satiate our need to eat the bacon.
So how does this apply to what is considered a love between two persons?
Let's assume that love between two humans follows the standard definition. Person 1 and 2 love each other because each provides affection and a feeling of personal attachment for the other. They can be considered "in love". Love then is the action.
From the Davidsonian standpoint, what are the reasons for love? If we desire affection and personal attachment, then love is a Davidsonian "thing". What we do gets us what we want. There is no Existential angst involved.
But as far as Kant's morality goes, if we desire love and affection, love is not moral because we benefit from it. Our reasons cause an action that gives us what we desire and is therefore immoral. We must love without expectation of any kind to satisfy Kant.
And that brings us back to Davidson. Can we love without any expectations?
There are no instances of love that do not invoke actions. We can not love for the sake of love because even then the action of love is caused by the action of loving. And because we benefit from this it is not Kantian moral.
The conclusion then is that love is both Davidsonian and Kantian. Love is not moral and benefits us. Love is never altruistic and always beneficial. Love is simply something that benefits us.
Kant believed that for a thing to be moral (action), one must not benefit from it because that destroys its value. Giving a beggar money then is not moral because one could benefit from it because one feels better about one's own condition. Basically altruism does not exist, as argued earlier (http://thewhyquestion.blogspot.com/2011/03/altruism-aka-lie-we-tell-ourselves.html).
Love is defined as having affection and personal attachment for something. We can love bacon (reason) so we cook and eat it as often as possible (action). But we benefit from it because it fulfills our need to satiate our need to eat the bacon.
So how does this apply to what is considered a love between two persons?
Let's assume that love between two humans follows the standard definition. Person 1 and 2 love each other because each provides affection and a feeling of personal attachment for the other. They can be considered "in love". Love then is the action.
From the Davidsonian standpoint, what are the reasons for love? If we desire affection and personal attachment, then love is a Davidsonian "thing". What we do gets us what we want. There is no Existential angst involved.
But as far as Kant's morality goes, if we desire love and affection, love is not moral because we benefit from it. Our reasons cause an action that gives us what we desire and is therefore immoral. We must love without expectation of any kind to satisfy Kant.
And that brings us back to Davidson. Can we love without any expectations?
There are no instances of love that do not invoke actions. We can not love for the sake of love because even then the action of love is caused by the action of loving. And because we benefit from this it is not Kantian moral.
The conclusion then is that love is both Davidsonian and Kantian. Love is not moral and benefits us. Love is never altruistic and always beneficial. Love is simply something that benefits us.
23 March 2011
Altruism aka the lie we tell ourselves subconsciously
Altruism (coined by Comte) is defined as "the selfless concern for the welfare of others." A little more clearly, it means doing x for y and not expecting anything in return. But is that possible? Can one genuinely do for others without expectation of reciprocation?
The classic example is giving money to a homeless person. What are is the true motive? Do you do it because you feel sorry for the person and want to help them out? Or do you feel guilty? Or do you do it to make yourself feel better? Can you ever really know the real answer?
Hume's belief that people are altruistic because of love is void. And he did it himself. Hume believed that people love others and feel sympathy for them and are thus altruistic. If you are sympathetic to someone, your actions are not altruistic. What you do benefits both of you. It helps the person and it relieves your angst about their condition.
Kant, being Kant, further warps altruism. He believed that there are universal laws (hi religion) and because of them we are required to help anyone we can. He took the onus of self-serving want off the table and placed it upon the universe. But in doing so, he complicated matters. To summarize the position, we help others because there are universal rules that say we must help all those we can help. But in doing so we relieve our angst at not following universal law.
Davidson and Haack have applied complex mathematics to try to solve the problem of intent. And really that is what altruism boils down to. The basic argument is that a person helps a homeless person not to help that person and not to give themselves satisfaction but for a more complex reason, possibly that the person is ashamed that his family is rich and intolerant of the homeless. And still, we are relieving ourselves of angst.
In the end, altruism does not exist. No matter the angle we approach it from, we are relieving ourselves of angst whether we do it consciously or not. We demand something in return for our act of "selflessness". We do it because we need to because in the end we are narcissists at our very core.
The classic example is giving money to a homeless person. What are is the true motive? Do you do it because you feel sorry for the person and want to help them out? Or do you feel guilty? Or do you do it to make yourself feel better? Can you ever really know the real answer?
Hume's belief that people are altruistic because of love is void. And he did it himself. Hume believed that people love others and feel sympathy for them and are thus altruistic. If you are sympathetic to someone, your actions are not altruistic. What you do benefits both of you. It helps the person and it relieves your angst about their condition.
Kant, being Kant, further warps altruism. He believed that there are universal laws (hi religion) and because of them we are required to help anyone we can. He took the onus of self-serving want off the table and placed it upon the universe. But in doing so, he complicated matters. To summarize the position, we help others because there are universal rules that say we must help all those we can help. But in doing so we relieve our angst at not following universal law.
Davidson and Haack have applied complex mathematics to try to solve the problem of intent. And really that is what altruism boils down to. The basic argument is that a person helps a homeless person not to help that person and not to give themselves satisfaction but for a more complex reason, possibly that the person is ashamed that his family is rich and intolerant of the homeless. And still, we are relieving ourselves of angst.
In the end, altruism does not exist. No matter the angle we approach it from, we are relieving ourselves of angst whether we do it consciously or not. We demand something in return for our act of "selflessness". We do it because we need to because in the end we are narcissists at our very core.
15 August 2009
Science as Religion
Saint Anselm, in the Monologion, postulated that there is some one thing that exists which all things exist and that one thing exists through itself so therefore is greater than all other things. The significance of this statement is that Anselm side-stepped the problem of faith in a fairly convincing way. He would later define his position even more sharply in Proslogion.
Religion is philosophy. For a religion to not be a philosophy, it must prove that its deity truly exists. None can do that and they rely upon "faith". The position of faith has been argued since before Anselm's time to the present. Kant worked around the issue with his Categorical Imperative, which loosely outlined, is the work towards the greatest good. Kierkegaard addressed faith as the only way a person can achieve the true self.
But Kierkegaard realized that Christian religion, and I would argue religion in general, harms itself with dogma, because its dogma denies reason because of its paradoxes. To counter this Kierkegaard made his argument of faith through the absurd (suspension of reason to believe in something higher than reason).
Interestingly, Pope John Paul II made this statement: Science can purify religion from error and superstition; religion can purify science from idolatry and false absolutes. Each can draw the other into a wider world, a world in which both can flourish (John Paul II, "Letter to Reverend George V. Coyne, S.J.", Origins, 378.).
It is a tantalizing statement. Science and religious philosophy have virtually always been at odds, basically because science does not require faith; science deals ultimately with absolutes (water exists). If science and religion work more closely, will science remove faith, as faith is superstition? Did John Paul introduce something more dangerous than the faith problem by introducing the possibility that science is religion?
Think about that last statement. Science deals with absolutes. It does not require Kierkegaard's absurd, embraces (to a point) Kant's Categorical Imperative, and also fulfills Anselm's test. For religion to be something other than philosophy, it must prove its deity exists absolutely and therefore remove the need for faith. Following this line, science is the only true religion. I tend to believe that John Paul saw this issue coming to a head in the near future and attempted to stave it off by joining religious belief with science again, as it was before Copernicus.
Religion is philosophy. For a religion to not be a philosophy, it must prove that its deity truly exists. None can do that and they rely upon "faith". The position of faith has been argued since before Anselm's time to the present. Kant worked around the issue with his Categorical Imperative, which loosely outlined, is the work towards the greatest good. Kierkegaard addressed faith as the only way a person can achieve the true self.
But Kierkegaard realized that Christian religion, and I would argue religion in general, harms itself with dogma, because its dogma denies reason because of its paradoxes. To counter this Kierkegaard made his argument of faith through the absurd (suspension of reason to believe in something higher than reason).
Interestingly, Pope John Paul II made this statement: Science can purify religion from error and superstition; religion can purify science from idolatry and false absolutes. Each can draw the other into a wider world, a world in which both can flourish (John Paul II, "Letter to Reverend George V. Coyne, S.J.", Origins, 378.).
It is a tantalizing statement. Science and religious philosophy have virtually always been at odds, basically because science does not require faith; science deals ultimately with absolutes (water exists). If science and religion work more closely, will science remove faith, as faith is superstition? Did John Paul introduce something more dangerous than the faith problem by introducing the possibility that science is religion?
Think about that last statement. Science deals with absolutes. It does not require Kierkegaard's absurd, embraces (to a point) Kant's Categorical Imperative, and also fulfills Anselm's test. For religion to be something other than philosophy, it must prove its deity exists absolutely and therefore remove the need for faith. Following this line, science is the only true religion. I tend to believe that John Paul saw this issue coming to a head in the near future and attempted to stave it off by joining religious belief with science again, as it was before Copernicus.
11 July 2009
Kant and Love
Kant put forth an idea that love is nothing more than the legal co-ownership of physical parts. Many philosophers have bemoaned this idea, notably Horkheimer, as though love is an actual obtainable ideal. I put forth that love is nothing more than acquiring goods in return for services, a form of capitalism, if you will.
Zeus would impregnate females on whim. De Sade used love for the purpose of exploring sexual taboos. English Parliament sought to marry its "virgin queen" to secure power over the French.
Throughout history love has been nothing more than utilitarian, except in the prose of the poets.
I state that love does not exist, but is simply a tool to achieve "something": power, riches, social standing, sexual fulfillment, and/or lust. I should have better defined "love". Love in the romantic sense can be best defined as a complex neurochemical response, one that can be mimicked by chocolate. The endorphins create a "pleasant" feeling, and one could argue, an addiction. This would explain the "heart break" phenomena.
My post is a bit of a Catch-22, on rethink. Stating that love is an acquisition of goods is almost equating it to the classic psychological question of "if you give a beggar money, do you do it for the beggar or yourself?" I suppose it opens love up to the Ontological question.
But, based on our knowledge of neurotransmitters, the endorphins and such, it does seem plausible that Kant was truly on to something more universal than the arranged marriages of his time.
I also agree that familial love is a bit different, but that too could be a form of endorphin addiction, though I would suspect that a different sort of neurotransmitter is involved. But, if familial love was without boundaries, without a give and take of wants, there would not be estranged families.
In all, love seems to be a complex weave of neuron firings, social more' fulfillment, and desired resolution of a want.
Zeus would impregnate females on whim. De Sade used love for the purpose of exploring sexual taboos. English Parliament sought to marry its "virgin queen" to secure power over the French.
Throughout history love has been nothing more than utilitarian, except in the prose of the poets.
I state that love does not exist, but is simply a tool to achieve "something": power, riches, social standing, sexual fulfillment, and/or lust. I should have better defined "love". Love in the romantic sense can be best defined as a complex neurochemical response, one that can be mimicked by chocolate. The endorphins create a "pleasant" feeling, and one could argue, an addiction. This would explain the "heart break" phenomena.
My post is a bit of a Catch-22, on rethink. Stating that love is an acquisition of goods is almost equating it to the classic psychological question of "if you give a beggar money, do you do it for the beggar or yourself?" I suppose it opens love up to the Ontological question.
But, based on our knowledge of neurotransmitters, the endorphins and such, it does seem plausible that Kant was truly on to something more universal than the arranged marriages of his time.
I also agree that familial love is a bit different, but that too could be a form of endorphin addiction, though I would suspect that a different sort of neurotransmitter is involved. But, if familial love was without boundaries, without a give and take of wants, there would not be estranged families.
In all, love seems to be a complex weave of neuron firings, social more' fulfillment, and desired resolution of a want.
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